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Abstract
The constantly evolving nature of the grid is
compelling the design process of Remedial Action
Schemes (RAS) to keep up with the changes. This
paper proposes a flexible and computationally efficient
approach to automatically determine RAS corrective
actions that alleviate line overloading violations.
Statistical and functional characteristics summarized
from RAS implemented in real power systems are
used to guide the design parameters. This paper
also leverages sensitivity-based techniques to determine
corrective actions for specific contingencies quickly
without repeated numerical simulations.
1. Introduction
Remedial Action Schemes (RAS), also referred
as Special Protection Systems (SPS), are operation
schemes designed to detect anomalous or predefined
system conditions, and take mitigation actions to
maintain the reliability and stability of power systems.
Such corrective actions may include adjusting status
and values (MW and Mvar) of load and generation,
and topology of the electric network [1]. RAS are
often required when the system is at risk for thermal
overloading, voltage instability, small signal instability,
transient instability and cascading outages [2]. RAS
are designed to take actions automatically when the
triggering conditions are met, and resolve the issue
within cycles to seconds for transient instability, and
within minutes for thermal overloads [3].
In the past, RAS were implemented locally
at substations or nearby control rooms. With the
growing number of RAS being designed and applied
in the system, and the expanding requirements to
conduct wide-area operational studies more frequently,
the power industry has largely embraced RAS as
a centralized scheme in operation centers for the
past decade [4]. The California Independent System
Operator, for example, implemented RAS in its energy
management system (EMS) in 2008, where RAS control
actions are simulated in the real-time contingency
analysis module [5]. Similarly, BC Hydro adopted
RAS as a basic operation tool in the control room,
where the arming of RAS is automatically executed
by the transient stability assessment function [6].
Bonneville Power Administration also embedded the
corrective schemes in its EMS. The RAS simulations are
conducted for both current and future hour operational
studies to maintain the system integrity [7].
The implementation of RAS in real-time operations
provides comfort to the operators to help ensure
the reliability and stability of the system after any
credible contingencies and events. As the electric power
industry is continually challenged with the increasing
power transfer, new generation interconnections, aging
equipment with limited capacity, and delays in
constructing major transmission projects, RAS are a
practical way of utilizing the existing infrastructure to
maximize the power transfer capability reliably [8, 9].
Traditional RAS design currently takes a holistic
approach that requires years of experience with the
operations of a specific system [10]. New RAS are
proposed to reliability coordinators individually by
entities such as transmission owners, generator owners,
and distribution providers based on their operational
experience. Each RAS is modeled and introduced to
the system individually to address some predetermined
contingencies that are known to cause violations of
reliability or stability standards [11]. To mitigate the
potential violations or instabilities, numerous off-line
simulations are repeated on those predefined scenarios
to ensure that the candidate remedial action is sufficient,
and does not introduce unintentional risks to the
system. The implementation and testing of the RAS
then involves manually defining the corrective action
for a contingency definition within the EMS or other
simulation software. The parameters associated with
each scheme, such as the arming conditions, triggering
threshold, and the numerical values of generation
tripping and load shedding, usually do not change during





real-time operations [12, 10].
Many research efforts, from both industry and
academia, have gone into improving the flexibility
and dynamics of RAS implementation. In [13], an
event-based method was proposed to enhance RAS that
are created to address specific frequency and voltage
instability issues. Using transient energy analysis, the
conventional RAS implementation can be adjusted with
flexible triggering thresholds [14], and also adaptive
corrective actions [15]. To mitigate the risk of voltage
instability and voltage collapse, BC Hydro developed
a methodology to determine the magnitude of load
shedding based on real-time measurement data [16].
Recent work of [17] proposed an approach to adaptively
set the arming parameters of existing RAS based on
realistic and near real-time operation conditions. These
RAS are automated in the sense that the parameters
adapt to real-time conditions, however the design of the
underlying RAS itself is manual.
In addition to the slow design process, the constantly
evolving nature of the grid is compelling RAS to keep
up with the changes. With the increasing penetration of
distributed energy resources such as solar photovoltaic
(PV) systems and wind farms, and grid-edge devices,
and the rise of unpredictable disturbances, a traditional
slow and manual RAS identification design process
may not suffice. Also, to mitigate the impacts of
these unpredictable events as they occur during grid
operations, it is important to address the design with
online time-frames in mind. The corrective actions
need to be computed fast, within seconds or minutes,
depending on the type of violation.
The power industry is cognizant of these evolving
needs and hence there are regular assessments of the
existing RAS’ adequacy and the need for upgrades.
For instance, in 2018 Hydro One in Canada replaced
the RAS at their Bruce substation [18]. This increased
the functionality to detect and operate for more
contingencies and configurations, and enhanced system
operation. Similarly, the need for and installation of new
RAS are announced regularly by different entities [19,
20, 21, 22]. However, the design process still involves
repeated, offline simulations.
Hence, this paper proposes a more flexible,
computationally efficient approach to determine
RAS corrective actions. The proposed RAS creation
procedure aims to automatically generate triggering
condition and corrective action pairs based on the
identified need for new RAS creation. Using a 2000-bus
synthetic system as an example, this paper focuses on
RAS that are created for line overloading mitigation.
Statistical and functional characteristics summarized
from RAS implemented in real power systems are
utilized as a reference to guide the design parameters.
Building on prior work on online RAS [23] where line
overloads were resolved by generation redispatch, this
approach also leverages sensitivity-based techniques,
and adds to it by considering two more types of
actions, i.e. line switching and load shed and selects
an “optimal” choice. Sensitivities such as line outage
distribution factors (LODF) and transmission loading
reliefs (TLR) are calculated rapidly using sparse vector
methods [24] to design corrective actions for specific
contingencies without repeated numerical simulations.
Since this approach only uses electric grid topology
and parameters as inputs for sensitivity analysis, it is
general enough to be applied to different systems.
2. Background
2.1. Traditional RAS Design Process
The need to modify existing RAS or design a
new RAS is usually identified during system planning
studies, which can range from utility to interconnection
scales [3]. From the utility scale, RAS entities can
submit proposals to their reliability coordinator (RC)
for RAS introduction, modification, and retirement.
The RC is responsible for approving or providing
revision comments after reviewing the proposal. On an
interconnection scale, RCs are required to review the
existing RAS within their territories every five years.
All the deficiencies identified during this review process
should be addressed by the corresponding RAS owners
within six months [11].
According to the Western Electricity Coordination
Council (WECC), there are four common elements
for the design of RAS: arming criteria, initiating
conditions, actions taken, and time requirements.
The arming criteria are critical system conditions
for which a step-wise RAS should be ready to
take action when required. The initial conditions
are the contingencies that have been know to cause
violations of reliability and stability standards, which
will initiate the RAS corrective action if the scheme
is armed. The initial conditions can be event-based,
parameter-based, response-based, or the combination
of the above. Event-based schemes directly detect
outages and/or fault events and initiate actions to
fully or partially mitigate the event consequence.
Parameter-based schemes measure variables for which
a significant change confirms the occurrence of a
critical event. Response-based schemes monitor system
response during events and disturbances and incorporate
a closed-loop process to react to actual system
conditions [12]. The work of [10] finds that most RAS
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in the WECC system initiate upon changes to system
topology, with very few being triggered by system
condition changes.
For a critical contingency, various potential remedial
actions are usually available to mitigate the violations
and improve system performance. The RAS actions
should at least result in an acceptable system operating
condition after the occurrence of a critical contingency
or a disturbance. The corrective action should not
introduce unintentional risks or interfere with the
performance of other RAS in the system. The corrective
actions may include but are not limited to [3]:





• Static VAR control units
• Capacitor and/or reactor switching
2.2. Sensitivity Analysis and Sparse Vector
Methods
Sensitivities are linearized relationships, which help
determine the impact of small changes in a variable on
the system. TLR sensitivities gauge the sensitivity of a
line flow to multiple power transfers, whereas LODF
depicts how the outage of one more more lines, taken
one at a time, affects the flows on the other lines. Both
these sensitivities can be derived from the Injection
Shift Factor (ISF) matrix represented by Ψ [25, 26, 27],
which is constructed using the lossless dc power flow
assumptions. The change in real power line flows is
given as,
∆f = Ψ∆p (1)
where ∆p is the vector of changes in the real power
injection at each bus, and the element ψnl in row l and
column n of Ψ is the ISF of line l with respect to the
injection at node n. For a system with L lines and N
nodes (buses), Ψ is defined as,
Ψ = B̃A[B′]
−1 (2)
where B̃ , -diag{b1, b2, ..., bL} (bl is the series
susceptance of line l), A is an L×N incidence matrix
where the element aij is non-zero only when line li is
coincident with node j, and B′ = ATB̃A.
For the sensitivity calculations, all the elements of
Ψ are not needed as only certain lines and nodes are
considered at a time, as will be shown below. Hence
the full matrix as described in (2) does not need to
be computed. Rather, the sensitivities of the elements
of interest can be found using sparse vector methods
[24]. For example, ∆p is sparse in this case since the
injection(s) contributed by the corrective action(s) are
limited in number due to a judicious selection of the
candidate nodes and the design criteria used. Because
of this, fast forward substitution can be used. Similarly,
monitoring a reasonable number of lines can help
make ∆f sparse, and enable the use of fast backward
substitution. This is able to substantially reduce the
computational complexity. Once the matrix is factored
(an O(n1.4) ) operation, doing a fast forward and fast
backward substitution involves very few (much less than
O(n)) operations [28, 24].
2.3. ACTIVSg2000 Synthetic System
The ACTIVSg2000 synthetic system is a fictitious
power network on the geographic footprint of Texas,
United States. It includes detailed modeling of
generators, loads, transmission lines, and other power
system elements. This test case and its relating
data are created using the methodology outlined in
[29, 30] which captures the structural and functional
characteristics of actual power grids. Figure 1 shows
the one-line diagram of the ACTIVSg2000 synthetic
transmission system. It has 2000 buses and 3206
transmission branches. The total electric load is 67
GW and the total generation capacity is 100 GW. The
500-kV, 230-kV and 115-kV network in this test case
are represented as the orange, purple and green lines in
the one-line diagram, respectively. Similar to the actual
grid in Texas, the wind generation resource is designed
to be abundant in the far west and panhandle area. Load
centers are in the east and central side of the system,
where Dallas, Houston, and Austin metropolitan areas
are located. Higher voltage transmission infrastructures
are constructed to connect the generation facilities to the
load clusters.
This test case has an initial ac power flow solution,
and it is N-1 secure. It also contains several common
control schemes and models such as switched shunts
and load tap changers for reactive power control,
generators that can remotely regulate voltages, phase
shift transformers, automatic generation control (AGC),
etc. On the dynamics side, it models the key generator
controls such as the exciter, governor, and stabilizer,
and even protection devices such as under-frequency
load relays. Thus, while there are several controls in
place to aid system security and stability in case of
contingencies, there is no particular RAS developed for
this test case. By developing RAS from scratch for
a synthetic, realistic system, we propose a method to
design new RAS in real grids.
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Figure 1. One-line diagram of the ACTIVSg2000
synthetic transmission model
3. Automated RAS Design Procedure
As mentioned earlier, the RAS design procedure
in this paper automatically generates triggering
condition and corrective action pairs, with a focus on
line overloading mitigation. The design parameters
are realistic as they are based on statistical and
functional characteristics derived from actual RAS
implementations. Sensitivity factors such as LODF and
TLR are used to quickly design corrective actions for
severe contingencies, eliminating the need for repeated
numerical simulations to determine the corrective
action(s). The 2000-bus synthetic system introduced
above is used here as the test case.
3.1. Problem Recognition
Problem recognition is the process of detecting
system operation violations, identifying the need for a
RAS, and determining the characteristics required to
mitigate the problems. In this paper, line overloading
violations are determined using an intentionally
constructed contingency list and transient stability
studies solely for the purpose of providing input data to
demonstrate the automatic RAS creation process.
3.1.1. Case Preparation: Transmission conductors
are always designed to be operated under certain
temperature limits to avoid damages to the equipment
[31]. Transmission facilities usually determine multiple
ratings for the conductors. Normal rating specifies the
level of electrical loading that one transmission line
can withstand through the daily demand cycles without
loss of equipment life. Emergency rating defines the
electrical loading that one transmission line can support
for a finite period of time, while assuming acceptable
loss of equipment life [31].
The violation of a transmission line normal
thermal limit is usually not an urgent problem. In
control rooms, established procedures exist to inform
the operators on the actions needed to bring the
transmission line flows down to acceptable thresholds
[8]. Generator dispatch programs in real-time operation,
such as security-constrained economic dispatch and
security-constrained optimal power flow, aim to
alleviate line violations by changing generator outputs
as well [25]. However, in case of a severe event,
transmission line loading may escalate quickly to
violate reliability standards by exceeding its short-term
emergency rating [32], or causing cascading tripping
of lines [33]. Under such extreme scenarios where
operators and embedded control programs do not have
enough time to react, automatic corrective actions are
needed to respond to the event immediately to prevent
unacceptable system operating conditions.
Based on typical current ratings of conductors at
each nominal voltage level, normal MVA limits of
transmission lines are calculated and included during
the creation process of the 2000-bus synthetic system
[29]. In this paper, for different voltage levels, the
ratio distribution of emergency MVA rating to normal
MVA rating is summarized based on real transmission
networks. This ratio distribution is then used to the
estimate emergency rating of each transmission line in
the 2000-bus synthetic network.
3.1.2. Triggering Condition Identification: To
identify severe overloading conditions where RAS are
needed in the synthetic system, a list of contingencies
modeling the loss of two bulk electric system elements
is created. This list considers two N-2 contingency
categories defined in North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC) transmission planning
performance requirements [34], where the multiple
contingencies from a common structure (P7), and two
overlapping single contingencies (P6) are considered.
As there are over 3,000 branches in the 2000-bus
synthetic system, it is unrealistic to use a complete
N-2 contingency list that includes every possible
combination. To effectively identify the set of
contingencies with severe consequences, the list is
reduced to only consider double line outage of branches
161 kV and above for P7 events. For P6 events, an
LODF screening tool is used to identify pairs of
contingencies that are significant without solving all the
contingencies [35]. Only those contingency pairs that
create line limit monitoring violations are included in
the contingency list.
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These contingencies are then modeled in a transient
stability simulation. The simulation duration is set to be
20 seconds, with a half-cycle time step. The MVA flows
of transmission lines 115 kV and above are monitored
for emergency rating violations. If there is at least one
branch with a sustained line overloading issue after the
outage or fault is applied, this contingency is considered
to be severe and in need of a RAS.
3.2. Corrective Actions
3.2.1. Industrial RAS Statistics: To guide the
design of corrective action for each line overloading
contingency identified in the previous steps, statistical
analysis was conducted on 41 RAS implemented in
real power systems to summarize their key features and
range of parameter values. All of the industrial RAS
used here are designed to alleviate one or multiple
transmission line thermal violations. Figure 2 shows the
four categories of corrective actions adopted by these
industrial RAS. Generator adjusting, which includes
the opening of generator units and changing generator
output set points, is the most commonly used action
to mitigate line overloads. Branch switching, and load
shedding are two other popular schemes adopted by the
industry. Some thermal violations also require hybrid
actions with a mix of generator adjusting, branch
opening and load shedding.
Figure 2. Corrective Action Types for Overload
Mitigation
Table 1 describes the characteristics and range of
key parameters for each corrective action type. For
branch switching schemes, the total number and MVA
capcity of lines opened, the number of nodes away
from the overloading line, and their nominal voltage
levels are recorded. For generator adjusting, the number
and MW value of generators adjusted, their distance
from the overloading line, and their fuel types are used
as reference for the corrective action design. For load
shedding, the number and MW value of load opened,















Nominal voltage (kV) 69-765 230
Generator
Number of gen adjusted 1-10 3















Table 1. Industrial RAS Corrective Action Statistics
3.2.2. Corrective Action Design: The procedure of
creating automated corrective actions is illustrated in
Figure 3. Information of the overloading lines identified
in the problem recognition step is used as the input
to shortlist the controllable elements that can be used
for the remedial actions. For a specific overloading
line, referencing Table 1, branches above 69-kV and
also within three nodes away are considered to be
controllable equipment. Besides the distance from
thermal violation location, generators are filtered out
based on their fuel types, where only wind, solar and
natural gas units will be used to develop corrective
actions. Loads that can be reduced to mitigate the
overloads are selected only based on their locations
relative to the overloading lines. This step limits the list
of controllable elements to a small number, so that the
real power injection change vector ∆p mentioned in the
background section is not full and sparse vector methods
can be applied to reduce the computation time.
To ensure that corrective actions can be
automatically created within the online simulation
time frame, sensitivity-based techniques are leveraged
to study the relationships between the controllable
elements and the overloading lines. To design the
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candidate branch switching scheme, the LODF matrix
represented by d is derived from the ISF matrix Ψ. An
element dkl of this matrix d can be written as,
dkl =
ψml − ψnl
1− (ψmk − ψnk )
(3)
where m and n are the two nodes associated with the
switched line k.
The real power flow change on line l due to the
switching of line k is given as,
∆fl = dfk (4)
where fk is the pre-switching real power flow on line
k. The branches selected to be controllable elements are
sorted by their pre-outaged flows, and LODF sensitivity
to the overloading lines. For the branch opening scheme,
those branches are switched open in this order until the
thermal violations are estimated to be alleviated.
The generator adjusting and load shedding candidate
actions are determined using TLR sensitivities. The TLR
sensitivity matrix is also derived from Ψ. It estimates the
impact of multiple transfers on one transmission line.







where l is the transmission line of interest, and two
nodesm and n define one transaction w.
The real power flow change on line l due to the




where ∆t is the amount of MW transfer associated with
transaction w. In this work, the adjustments made on
generation and load values and status are modeled as
transactions. Similar to the branch switching scheme,
the generators and loads selected to be controllable
elements are sorted based on their TLR sensitivities and
current generation or load MW values. This determines
the order of operation until the overloading issue is
mitigated.
The three candidate actions are then evaluated
based on their effectiveness and simplicity. The final
proposed RAS is selected based on this evaluation. The
effectiveness of a RAS means that the corrective action
can successfully mitigate the overloading issues as
intended without introducing any unexpected violations.
This is quantified by the post-contingency loading on the
targeted lines that have exhibited violations without the
implementation of RAS. The simplicity of the candidate
action is defined as the total number of elements
involved in one scheme.
This methodology is illustrated in the next section
with two examples, however, its description so far has
shown that it is general enough to be applied to most
systems, to design RAS for line overloads.
Figure 3. Automated RAS Procedure Flow Chart
4. ACTIVSg2000 Example RAS
The proposed automated RAS procedure shown in
Figure 3 is illustrated for application in two examples in
this section. The examples consider the risk of thermal
overload on transmission lines and transformers. The
real world is concerned with additional risks, including
voltage instability, small signal instability, transient
instability and cascading outages. The options for
corrective actions are load shedding, line switching, and
generator output adjustments.
4.1. Example RAS 1
The first example RAS created is located in West
Texas, an area with concentrated wind resources.
Substations constructed to house wind generation
facilities are interconnected with a 115 kV network in
the synthetic system. Figure 4 is a one-line diagram
showing the pre-contingency system conditions of this
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region. The percentage line flows are shown using pie
charts [36]. The transmission system is loaded around
30 to 50 percent when all the wind units are producing
electricity, and all the 115 kV lines are online.
However, a severe contingency is identified in the
region. Illustrated in Figure 5, with the loss of two
115 kV transmission lines, NOLAN 0 to TUSCOLA
0, and NOLAN 0 to TUSOCOLA 1, the branch flow
between substation NOLAN and TRENT would surge
to 110% of its emergency rating, which is considered as
an unacceptable operating condition.
To mitigate the impact of this contingency, a
list of generators, loads and branches are chosen
as controllable devices for corrective actions. Within
this element list, the wind generator at substation
NOLAN is directly connected to the bus related to
the overloading line. As the other two lines coming
out of NOLAN substation are outaged, 100% of the
generation reduction from this generator is reflected as
the decrease of flow from NOLAN 0 to TRENT 0 1. Due
to its simplicity and effectiveness, the opening of this
generator is chosen to be the corrective action . Shown
in Figure 6, if the severe contingency is detected, the
127MW wind generator at NOLAN substation would
open, and relieve the NOLAN 0 to TRENT 0 1 line
from 110% loading to 1% loading. On an Intel® Xeon®
E5-1650 V4 CPU @ 3.6GHz with 32GB RAM, 64-bit
OS, x-64 based processor, the corrective actions can be
created within a few seconds.
Figure 4. ACTIVSg2000 Example 1: Pre-Contingency
4.2. Example RAS 2
The second example RAS is located in the Dallas
metropolitan area, where load clusters are connected
with a 161 kV network in the synthetic system. Figure
7 is a one-line diagram showing the pre-contingency
system conditions of this area. During the summer peak
scenario that the synthetic case represents, the most
Figure 5. ACTIVSg2000 Example 1:
Post-Contingency, without RAS
Figure 6. ACTIVSg2000 Example 1:
Post-Contingency, with RAS
loaded line in the system is DALLAS 31 to DALLAS
36.
Illustrated in Figure 8, after the loss of two 161
kV transmission lines, DALLAS 21 to DALLAS 23,
and DALLAS 25 to DALLAS 23, the branch flow
between substation DALLAS 31 and DALLAS 36
would increase to 103% of its emergency rating without
the implementation of a RAS.
Based on the bus numbers related to this line
violation, a list of loads and branches are chosen as
controllable devices for corrective actions. Here, the
option to use generator adjusting as a corrective action
is eliminated since there is no generator nearby. Two
candidate corrective actions that focus on load shedding
and branch switching respectively are evaluated. In the
first candidate action, the 67 MW load at substation
DALLAS 23 is proposed to be taken offline. This load
is 1 node away from the the overloading line. According
to the TLR analysis, 57.6% of the load reduction from
this location is reflected as the decrease of flow on the
overloading line. In the second candidate action, the
transmission line between ADDISON and DALLAS 31
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is switched open. This branch is loaded at 89 MVA
before the contingency, and the LODF analysis shows
that a 45 MVA reduction can be seen on the overloading
branch from the line switching. As the branch switching
scheme has a larger alleviation on the overloading line,
and does not require service interruption to customers,
it is selected to be the corrective action. This corrective
action also only takes a few seconds to generate using
the computer system described in example RAS 1.
Figures 9 and 10 also compare the effectiveness
of the two candidate actions. With load shedding, the
overloading line is reduced to 87%, while with branch
switching, the loading is reduced to 62%.
Figure 7. ACTIVSg2000 Example 2: Pre-Contingency
Figure 8. ACTIVSg2000 Example 2:
Post-Contingency, without RAS
Figure 9. ACTIVSg2000 Example 2:
Post-Contingency, with Candidate Action 1
Figure 10. ACTIVSg2000 Example 2:
Post-Contingency, with Candidate Action 2
5. Conclusions and Future Work
The constantly evolving nature of the grid is
compelling the design process of RAS to keep
up with the changes. To address this issue, this
paper has proposed a flexible and computationally
efficient approach to determine RAS corrective actions
that alleviate line overloading violations. Statistical
and functional characteristics summarized from RAS
implemented in real power systems are used to guide
the design parameters. This paper also leverages
sensitivity-based techniques such as LODF and TLR to
determine corrective actions for specific contingencies
rapidly without repeated numerical simulations. This
proposed method provides a useful methodology for
power system real-time operations, as the corrective
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actions are determined only within seconds for a
2000-bus realistic test system. Following this approach,
it is expected that based on 1) the size/complexity of the
system and 2) the type and severity of the violations, the
unpredictable events could be addressed in a timely (i.e.
seconds to minutes) and reliable manner.
This work sets the path forward towards a fully
automated remedial action scheme design process.
Future development includes, but is not limited to the
following items.
• Developing an online screening tool for problem
recognition that detects system operating
violations and identifies the need for a RAS
rapidly.
• Expanding the scope to address other operation
problems such as voltage violations and
instabilities.
• Utilizing stochastic scenarios in the synthetic
system to dynamically calculate RAS parameters
such as time delays or load shedding amounts.
• Developing more comprehensive RAS evaluation
metrics that quantifies system performance and
complexity of proposed RAS.
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